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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States' mathematical community has been
directing unprecedented attention to the problem of partisan
gerrymandering,' aided by computational advances 2 and spurred by
litigation challenging the spate of extreme partisan redistricting that
followed the 2010 census. 3 As North Carolina scholars who have been
involved in these efforts through the Quantifying Gerrymandering research
group in the Department of Mathematics at Duke University, 4 we have
developed and witnessed the emergence of promising new statistical
methods for identifying partisan gerrymandering and quantifying its effects.
One of us also provided expert testimony in Common Cause v. Rucho' based

1.

See, e.g., Carrie Arnold, The Mathematicians Who Want to Save Democracy, 546

NATURE 200, 200-02 (June 8, 2017); Nate Cohn & Quoctrung Bui, How the New Math of

Gerrymandering
Works,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/03/upshot/how-the-new-math-of-gerrymander
ing-works-supreme-court.html; Dawn Chan, A Summer School for Mathematicians Fed Up
with Gerrymandering,NEW YORKER (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annalsof-technology/a-summer-school-for-mathematicians-fed-up-with-gerrymandering;
Erica
Klarreich, Gerrymanderingis Illegal, but Only MathematiciansCan Prove It, WIRED (Apr. 16,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/gerrymandering-illegal-mathematicianscan-prove; Stephen Ornes, Math Tools Send Legislators Back to the Drawing Board, 115
PROC. NAT'LACAD. SCI. 6515 (2018).
2.
See, e.g., Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting
Tool: A ComputationalMethodfor Identifying Extreme RedistrictingPlans, 15 ELECTION L.J.
351, 357 (2016) (observing the recent "proliferation of significant computing power" and
presenting an approach "to integrate technological advances with our articulated strategy for
analyzing, contextualizing, and understanding redistricting plans").
3.
See, e.g., DAVID DALEY, RATF* *KED xv (1st ed. 2016) (describing activities of the
Republican State Leadership Committee's Redistricting Majority Project ("REDMAP"));
Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and Association, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2159, 2173
(2018) (describing the post-2010 redistricting cycle as "witness[ing] some of the most extreme
partisan gerrymanders ever"); Matt Pancia, Math Equations Could Help Fight
Gerrymandering, in GERRYMANDERING AND VOTING DISTRICTS 25, 25-27 (Rita Santos ed.

2018) (same); Michael Li et al., The State of Redistricting Litigation, BRENNANCENTER.ORG
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation (tracking the
status of pending redistricting litigation across the United States).
4.
See QUANTIFYING GERRYMANDERING, https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerry
mandering (last visited Apr. 30, 2019).
5. 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 870-74 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (discussing testimony of Jonathan
Mattingly).
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on the group's analysis of North Carolina's congressional map.6 Another of
us filed an amicus brief in Rucho's appeal now pending before the United
States Supreme Court.' We are writing this Article with the threefold aim of
explaining how the analysis was performed, how it was used to substantiate
the plaintiffs' claims at trial and on remand, and crucially, how it may serve
to address the justiciability concerns that have long attended the Supreme
Court's partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence and have represented the
legal context for our work.
The justiciability of equal protection challenges to partisan
gerrymandering has been hanging in the balance since 2004, when in Vieth
8
v. Jubelirer,
Pennsylvania voters challenged a 2002 plan under which
Republicans were expected to win thirteen of nineteen congressional seats
on less than fifty percent of the statewide popular vote. 9 The plaintiffs had
proposed a discriminatory effect test whereby a court would determine
whether "the 'totality of circumstances' confirms that the map can thwart the
plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats."'o
A majority of the Court found this test irrelevant and unmanageable," and
four justices voted to hold equal protection and elections clause challenges
to partisan gerrymandering non-justiciable.' 2 Justice Anthony Kennedy's
pivotal concurrence, however, left open the possibility of "new methods of
analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens
gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties."13
Last year, the plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitfordl4 proposed the efficiency gap
as one such new method of analysis in connection with their equal protection
challenge to legislative redistricting in Wisconsin. " The efficiency gap is a

6.
See Decl. of Jonathan Mattingly, Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777
(No.
1:16-CV-1026-WO-JEP),
http://sl0294.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ExpertReport-of-Jonathan-Mattingly.pdf.
7.
Br. of 27 Election Law, Scientific Evidence, and Empirical Legal Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellees, Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422 (S.Ct. filed Mar. 8,
2019) (identifying Andrew Chin as counsel for amici).
8.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
9.
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
10. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286-87.
11. See id. at 287-90; id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
agreement with Part III of the plurality opinion).
12. See id. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
13. Id. at 313.
14. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018).
15. See id. at 1932-33 (describing efficiency gap) (citing Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos
& Eric M. McGhee, Gerrymanderingand the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 831 (2015));
Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55 (2014).
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"single calculation ... that compares each party's respective 'wasted' votes
across all legislative districts," where a wasted vote is one "cast for a losing
candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that candidate needs
to win."1 6 As a succinct measure of the statewide disparity between the
ability of the major political parties to convert votes into legislative seats, the
efficiency gap was designed in large part to address Justice Kennedy's
justiciability concerns in Vieth. '7 In Gill, a three-judge district court panel
credited the historically large efficiency gaps observed in Wisconsin's recent
elections as evidence that substantial Republican advantages due to partisan
considerations in redistricting would likely persist for the life of the plan. 18
As one of us argued as an amicus curiae in the case,1 9 these findings would
have readily survived appellate review under the deferential standard
applicable to a trial court's weighing of statistical evidence. 20 Gill therefore
represented, in our colleague Guy-Uriel Charles's words, "the perfect
opportunity for the [Supreme] Court to address the political gerrymandering
question once and for all." 2 1

On appeal, however, the Supreme Court in Gill unanimously held that
the equal protection injury to a voter from partisan gerrymandering is
district-specific. 22 in vacating and remanding the case for lack of standing, 23
the Court faulted the efficiency gap for measuring only "the effect that a
gerrymander has on the fortune of political parties" and not "the effect that a
gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens." 24 In addition, the Court
found the efficiency gap incapable of distinguishing between districts with
naturally occurring and deliberately manipulated concentrations of
Democratic voters. 25 Beyond these objections, mathematicians and social
scientists have identified other anomalies in the efficiency gap formula that
the Court left unaddressed. 26

16. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924 (citation omitted).
17. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 895-99.
18. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 905-06 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
19. See Br. of 44 Election Law, Scientific Evid., and Empirical Legal Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Supp. of Appellees, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161)
[hereinafter Gill Amicus Brief].
20. See id. at 18-19.
21. Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial
Restraint, 132 HARv. L. REV. 236, 237 (2018).
22. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
23. See id. at 1934.
24. Id. at 1933.
25. See id.
26. See Mira Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 64 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL Soc'Y 1020,
1022-24 (2017) (explaining, inter alia, that the efficiency gap enshrines the judicially
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Justice Kennedy has since retired, 27 but plaintiffs around the country are
continuing to respond to his call for a justiciable approach to quantifying the
harms of partisan gerrymandering. Most promisingly, advances in
computationally randomized simulations of the redistricting process have
enabled plaintiffs to produce large sets (ensembles) of compliant plans from
which courts can statistically infer discriminatory intent and effect. These
efforts have already successfully supported a state constitutional claim, with
dramatic results. In Pennsylvania, where the League of Women Voters
challenged the state's congressional plan under the Pennsylvania
constitution's equal protection guarantee, 28 expert witness Jowei Chen
generated two sets of 500 plans to illustrate "the potential range of
redistricting plans attempting to apply the traditional redistricting criteria. "29
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Chen's plans to be compelling
evidence that the enacted plan unconstitutionally "subordinate[d] the
traditional redistricting criteria in the service of partisan advantage."30
Another expert witness, Wesley Pegden, presented a more extensive and
rigorous ensemble analysis involving approximately one trillion randomly
generated variations.3' Pegden's approach is especially promising as it is
potentially capable of generating ensembles from which statistically
significant findings can be inferred.3 2 The court found that Pegden's
methodology withstood a challenge from defendants' expert Wendy Cho,
and supported the conclusion that the challenged map was "a statistical
outlier as compared to maps with nearly identical population equality,
contiguity, compactness, and number of county splits." 33 The court ordered a

unrecognized principle that "the seat lean should be twice the vote lean" and incentivizes the
drawing of districts with a 75-25 partisan split, but concluding that the Supreme Court should
accept the efficiency gap "as a starting point in building a test to show when entrenched
partisan advantage has risen to the level of vote dilution of political opponents"); Christopher
P. Chambers et al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J. L. & POL. 1, 33 (2017) (making similar
criticisms, and concluding that "we must work harder to find" judicially manageable standards
for partisan gerrymandering); see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 949-50, 958-59,
965 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting) (making similar criticisms, and concluding
that "the efficiency gap theory . . . fatally relies on premises the courts have already rejected").
27. See Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedyretire-supreme-court.html.
28. League of Women Voters v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018).
29. See id. at 818 (discussing expert testimony of Dr. Chen).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 776-77.
32. See generally Maria Chikina et al., Assessing Significance in a Markov Chain
Without Mixing, 114 PROCS. NAT'L ACAD. Scis. 2860 (2017).
33. See League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 779-80 (citation omitted).
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remedial plan to be used in the 2018 primary and general congressional
elections.3 4 Partisan observers both credited and blamed the court-ordered
redistricting with helping Pennsylvania Democrats gain three U.S. House
seats in November 2018.35

Last year's developments in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania have set up
Rucho v. Common Cause, a challenge to North Carolina's 2016
congressional redistricting plan, as a key test of whether the ensemble
approach supplies the necessary analytical framework for an evidence-based
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims under the United States
Constitution. 36 Rucho came on the heels of litigation earlier this decade that
ultimately resulted in the invalidation of two districts in the state's 2011
congressional plan as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. 37 In the ensuing
2016 court-ordered redistricting, Republican state legislators commissioned
and expressly directed a map-drawing expert to maintain the Republicans'
10-3 majority in the state's delegation. 38 Under the resulting remedial plan,
North Carolina Republicans in November 2016 won ten of the state's
thirteen United States House seats on 53.22 percent of the statewide popular
vote.39

In Rucho, Common Cause, together with voters from each of the state's
thirteen congressional districts and other plaintiffs, 40 brought claims against
legislative and state defendants responsible for drafting and implementing
the 2016 remedial plan for violations of Article I, the First Amendment, and

34.
35.

See id. at 825.
See David A. Lieb, Election Shows How Gerrymanderingis Difficult to Overcome,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov.
17, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/3b4e63717bl64dcl9
9d02bd21aa17307 (reporting League of Women Voters plaintiff Bill Marx's comment that the
November 2018 election resulted in "a more fair congressional representation of the will of the
people in Pennsylvania" and state Republican Party spokesman Jason Gottesman's statement
that "[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court robbed us of at least three to four congressional seats"
by ordering the redistricting).
36. See also Charles & Fuentes-Rhower, supra note 21, at 237 (describing Rucho as a
case that "combine[s] all of the issues presented in Gill and Benisek in a single case"). Oral
argument in Rucho v. Common Cause has been set for March 2019. See Rucho v. Common
Cause, No. 18-422 (S. Ct. Jan. 4, 2019) (jurisdiction postponed).
37. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 627 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom.
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017).
38. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 807-08 (M.D.N.C. 2018)
(describing proposal and adoption of "Partisan Advantage" criterion that directed redistricting
consultant Thomas Hofeller's drawing of the 2016 redistricting plan).
39. See id. at810.
40. One lawsuit filed by Common Cause, the North Carolina Democratic Party, and
fourteen voters and another filed by the League of Women Voters of North Carolina and
twelve voters have been consolidated by the district court. See id. at 810-11.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41At trial, one of
us testified as an expert for Common Cause based on ensemble analyses
performed by our research team centered at Duke University's Department
of Mathematics. 42 After a four-day trial, a three-judge panel majority found
for the plaintiffs on all claims and enjoined the 2016 plan's use in the 2018
elections. 43 The Supreme Court promptly stayed the district court's
injunction, 44 however, and ultimately vacated and remanded the trial court's
decision for reconsideration in light of its standing decision in Gill.45 On

remand, the district court reaffirmed its findings of constitutional
violations, 46 but not in time for the plaintiffs to propose meaningful relief
ahead of November. 47 Despite a national "blue wave," 48 North Carolina
Republicans managed to elect nine out of twelve representatives to the 116th
Congress on a 50.39%- 4 8 .3 5 % majority of the statewide popular vote, with
one district's election results nullified amid charges of felony election
fraud. 49 The court did enjoin the 2016 plan's use in any election after
November 6, 2018.50 The plans for North Carolina's 2020 congressional

41. Seeid.at799.
42. See id. at 870-74 (describing testimony of Jonathan Mattingly); see also Sachet
Bangia et al., Redistricting: Drawing the Line, ARXIV.ORG, https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03360
(last updated May 8, 2017) (presenting ensemble analyses of 2016 North Carolina
congressional plan).
43. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 690 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
44. Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (mem.).
45. Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (mem.).
46. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 941.
47. Mem. Regarding Remedies from the Common Cause and League of Women Voters
Plaintiffs at 5, Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-CV1026-WO-JEP (asserting that "every election conducted under an unconstitutional plan visits
irreparable harm on voters," but concluding that "a statewide redistricting just weeks before
Election Day would not be a good-government solution").
48. See, e.g., B.J. Rudell, 2018 Midterms: A Blue Wave or Merely an Electoral
Adjustment Into a New Presidency?, HILL (Dec.
2,
2018,
5:00 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/419308-2018-midterm-election-a-blue-wave-or-merelyan-electoral-adjustment-into-a (concluding that "no midterm election in the past century or
more has been so lopsided" as 2018).
49. 2018 United States House of Representatives Elections in North Carolina,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_UnitedStatesHouse-ofRepresentatives_
elections inNorthCarolina (last visited May 7, 2019). The State Board of Elections has
found that fraud invalidated the ninth district's results in the 2018 general election and has set
dates for new primary and general elections in 2019. See Alan Blinder, North Carolina Sets
New Date for Redo Election in Congressional House Race, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/north-carolina-special-election-house-ninth.html.
50. See Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 942.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 16
1248

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.70: 1241

elections are therefore still at stake as the case returns on appeal to the
Supreme Court this term.I'
The aim of this Article is to highlight the significant and distinctive role
ensemble methods are likely to play in the Supreme Court's forthcoming
adjudication of Rucho. Three questions have been presented on appeal: (1)
whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering
claims; (2) whether plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims are
justiciable; (3) and whether North Carolina's 2016 congressional map is, in
fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 52 As we will aim to show in
this Article, our ensemble analysis in Rucho has provided the Supreme Court
with a powerful set of new analytical tools for adjudicating at least the first
two of these questions. Further proceedings in Rucho will hold special
importance for the many teams of mathematical scientists around the
country who are continuing to develop and refine the ensemble approach as
a statistically informed response to Justice Kennedy's call in Vieth for "new
methods of analysis." 5 3 Ultimately, however, it remains for the Court to
determine whether and how to apply these methodological advances to the
third question on appeal; i.e., the formulation and application of
constitutional standards in Rucho and in future cases.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the
search for a justiciable quantitative standard for partisan gerrymandering,
contrasting the ensemble approach with previous efforts to quantify the
effects of gerrymandering in terms of partisan symmetry measures. 4 Part III
describes how the Duke team generated, analyzed, and presented the
ensemble of North Carolina congressional plans at trial in Rucho." Part IV
reviews the district court's adjudication of our ensemble evidence in

51. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018) (mem.).
52. See id.
53. See generally, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket:
Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of PartisanGerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331
(2015); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, UnintentionalGerrymandering:Political Geography
and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013) [hereinafter Unintentional
Gerrymandering];Maria Chikina et al., Assessing Significance in a Markov Chain Without
Mixing, 114 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 2860 (2017); Moon Duchin, Outlier Analysis for
Pennsylvania Congressional Redistricting (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://sites. tufts.edu/vrdi/files/2018/06/md-report.pdf; Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering
Grp., Comparison of Districting Plans for the Virginia House of Delegates, MGGG.ORG,
https://mggg.org/VA-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Benjamin Fifield et al., Benjamin
Fifield et al., A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(May
24,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist.pdf.
54. See infra pp. 1249-57
55. See infra pp. 1258-68.
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addressing the Supreme Court's standing and justiciability concerns on
remand in the wake of Gill.56 Part V concludes by discussing ongoing work
to improve the ensemble approach for future adjudication of constitutional
challenges to partisan gerrymandering. 7
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ENSEMBLE APPROACH

A.

The Searchfor a JusticiableStandard

Setting the stage for Gill was a line of Supreme Court caselaw that has
preserved the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims in principle,
but has rejected every proposed test for adjudicating such claims in practice.
For example, in Davis v. Bandemer," Indiana Democrats brought an equal
protection challenge to legislative plans under which they won only 43 of
100 House seats despite receiving 51.9 percent of votes cast statewide. 59 The
district court sustained the challenge.60 Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice
White reasoned that the mutability of partisan affiliation might be relevant to
the manner in which a partisan gerrymandering claim is adjudicated under
equal protection doctrine, but does not distinguish such a claim from racial
gerrymandering claims in terms of justiciability.61
In a plurality part of the opinion, Justice White elaborated on the basic
requirements of discriminatory intent and effect for an equal protection
challenge in the context of partisan gerrymandering. 62 In affirming the trial
court's intent finding, 63 Justice White observed that "districting inevitably
has and is intended to have substantial political consequences," and even
where drafters work "'with census, not political, data and achieve population
equality without regard for political impact,"' any resulting discriminatory
effect is ultimately intentional. 64 The discriminatory effect requirement, on

56. See infra pp. 1269-75. A review of the entire remand opinion in Rucho is beyond
the scope of this Article.
57. See infra p. 1275-76.
58. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
59. See id at 115.
60. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1495-96 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
61. Davis, 478 U.S. at 125.
62. See id at 127 (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980)) ("We also agree
with the District Court that in order to succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove
both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group.").
63. See id. at 127.
64. [T]his politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the
most grossly gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it is most unlikely that
the political impact of such a plan would remain undiscovered by the time it
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the other hand, could not be satisfied "by the simple fact of an
apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult" or "a
failure of proportional representation alone." 6 5 Instead, wrote Justice White,
"unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a whole." 66 Against this
standard, Justice White criticized the trial court's effect findings, which had
been based primarily on the results of the 1982 elections, 67 noting that
"[r]elying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is
unsatisfactory." 68 He also found reversible error in the lack of any finding
that the challenged plans "would consign the Democrats to a minority status
in the Assembly throughout the 1980's or that the Democrats would have no
hope of doing any better in the reapportionment that would occur after the
1990 census."

69

Next, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,70 Pennsylvania voters brought an equal
protection challenge to a redistricting plan under which Republicans
allegedly held voting majorities in thirteen of Pennsylvania's nineteen U.S.
House districts even though Democrats outnumbered Republicans in the
state. 7 ' The district court dismissed the challenge as "simply an argument for
proportional representation," which had been rejected in Bandemer as a
basis for an equal protection claim. 72 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs argued that discriminatory intent could be proven by a showing
"by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that other neutral and
legitimate redistricting criteria were subordinated to the goal of achieving
partisan advantage." 73 The plaintiffs further argued that discriminatory effect
could be shown when "(1) the plaintiffs show that the districts systematically
'pack' and 'crack' the rival party's voters, and (2) the court's examination of
the 'totality of circumstances' confirms that the map can thwart the
plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats." 74

was proposed or adopted, in which event the results would be both known and,
if not changed, intended.
Id. at 129 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)).
65. Id. at 132 (citing Mobile, 446 U.S. at 111 n.7).
66. Id. at 132.
67. Id. at 134.
68. Id. at 135.
69. Id. at 135-36.
70. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
71. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
72. See id.
73. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284.
74. Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
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A 5-4 majority voted to affirm the judgment, with Justice Scalia authoring a
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy writing a separate concurrence, and
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer writing separate dissents in which each
proposed a different standard for adjudication.7 5 Writing for four Justices,
Justice Scalia questioned whether the plaintiffs' intent test required that
partisan intent "outweigh" all other redistricting goals and how such
"'outweighing' [is] to be determined." 76 He also criticized the proposed
effect standard as relying on a nonexistent group right to proportional
representation.7 7 Scalia proceeded to conclude from the eighteen-year
absence of judicially discernible and manageable standards for partisan
gerrymandering claims that none would ever be forthcoming.7 1
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Vieth, however, took a longer view
regarding the potential emergence of "suitable standards with which to
measure the burden a gerrymander imposes on representational rights." 79 He
identified:
[T]he "rapid evolution of technologies in the apportionment field"
as presenting both a potential "threat" in the hands of those who
would "use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional
manner," and a potential "promise" as a source of "new methods of
analysis .

.

. [t]hat would facilitate court efforts to identify and

remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the
derived standards." 80
Kennedy further opined that liability for partisan gerrymandering "must rest
on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were
applied," and "must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications,
though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a
way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.""
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry82 (L ULA C), Texas
interest groups brought equal protection and First Amendment challenges to
an unusual mid-decade redistricting plan that was allegedly "driven solely

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 269.
Id at 281.
Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 312-13.
Id at 307.
548 U.S. 399 (2006).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 16
1252

[VOL.70: 1241

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

by a partisan agenda." 83 On remand after Vieth, the plaintiffs asked the
district court to "distill from the Vieth opinions" the rule that a mid-decade
redistricting is unconstitutional "when the evidence makes clear that the
legislature was driven solely by a partisan agenda." 8 4 The district court
declined to do so and dismissed the challenges.1 5 On appeal, Justice
Kennedy wrote an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court86 in which
he also provided his separate views regarding the plaintiffs' proposed test. 87
For Justice Kennedy, the test's lack of an effect prong was fatal in that a
partisan gerrymandering claim "must do what appellants' sole-motivation
theory explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on the complainants' representational rights."" Kennedy pointed
out that the Texas plan appeared to have less of a discriminatory effect than
the plan that survived constitutional scrutiny in Vieth, at least by the "rough
measure" of vote-seat parity. 89
In finding the lack of a reliable standard for discriminatory effect in
LULAC, Justice Kennedy also considered a partisan bias standard proposed
in political scientist Gary King's amicus brief.90 King's standard measures
the partisan bias of a plan in terms of "the extent to which a majority party
would fare better than the minority party, should their respective shares of
the vote reverse." 91 Justice Kennedy suggested the proposed standard, while
potentially informative, would not be judicially discoverable and
manageable:
Even assuming a court could choose reliably among different
models of shifting voter preferences, we are wary of adopting a
constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results
that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.

. .

. Without

altogether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and

83. Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id at 778.
86. League of UnitedLatin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 408.
87. Id. (citing Part II-C of the opinion).
88. Id. at418.
89. Id. at 419 ("To be sure, there is no constitutional requirement of proportional
representation, and equating a party's statewide share of the vote with its portion of the
congressional delegation is a rough measure at best.").
90. See id. at 419-20.
91. Id. at 420 (citing Br. of Amici Curiae Professor Gary King et al. at 5, League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05439)).
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litigation, I would conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable
measure of unconstitutional partisanship. 92
Other Justices took a more positive view of King's proposal. In
dissenting from Justice Kennedy's rejection of the plaintiffs' proposed test,
Justices Stevens and Souter suggested the possibility that some partisan
symmetry standard could serve as a reliable measure of discriminatory effect
in a future case. 93

The Court's rejections of the plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering
standards in Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC led the plaintiffs in Gill to frame
their case around a partisan symmetry measure that (1) did not appeal to an
unrecognized principle of proportional representation, and (2) was calculated
from actual, not hypothetical, election results. 94 The next section discusses
some of the difficulties of this approach.
B.

The Focus on PartisanSymmetry

Supported by well-established political science literature, 95 the Gill
plaintiffs followed the LULAC plaintiffs in seeking to frame their partisan
gerrymandering claims against a baseline of partisan symmetry; i.e., the

92. Id. at 420 (citation omitted).
93. See id. at 466-67 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
partisan symmetry as "undoubtedly 'a reliable standard' for measuring a 'burden . . on the
complainants' representative rights' and finding the measure sufficient to show
discriminatory effect in the instant case (citation omitted)); id at 468 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I appreciate Justice Kennedy's leaving the door
open to the use of the [partisan symmetry] standard in future cases."); id. at 483-84 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[N]or do I rule out the utility of a criterion of
symmetry as a test . . . . Interest in exploring this notion is evident . . . . Perhaps further

attention could be devoted to the administrability of such a criterion at all levels of
redistricting and its review." (citations omitted)).
94. See id. at 420 (rejecting a proposed partisan symmetry standard that would
"invalidate[] a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs");
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284-88 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a proposed
discriminatory effect standard as "rest[ing] upon the principle that groups (or at least politicalaction groups) have a right to proportional representation"); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
129-32 (1986) (rejecting a proposed discriminatory effect requirement that could be satisfied
by "a failure of proportional representation alone. . . .").
95. See generally Robert X. Browning & Gary King, Seats, Votes, and
Gerrymandering: Estimating Representation and Bias in State Legislative Redistricting, 9
LAW & POL'Y 305 (1987); Bernard Grofman, Measures ofBias and Proportionalityin SeatsVotes Relationships, 9 POL. METHODOLOGY 295 (1983); Gary King & Robert X. Browning,
Democratic Representation and PartisanBias in CongressionalElections, 81 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 1251 (1987); Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party
Systems, 67 AM. POL. SC. REV. 540 (1973).
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expectation that the two major political parties should each require the same
statewide number of popular votes to win a given number of legislative
seats.9 6 When LULAC amici Bernard Grofman and Gary King had proposed
a constitutional standard based on a partisan symmetry measure, they found
no takers, although five Justices declined to rule out the use of partisan
symmetry as part of a broader test.9 7 A decade later, the Gill plaintiffs
presented the efficiency gap, a different partisan symmetry measure intended
in large part to address Justice Kennedy's misgivings about Grofman and
King's proposed standard in LULAC. 98 The efficiency gap compares both
major parties' votes "wasted"-either in a losing cause or in excess of the
number needed to win-across all districts, and is therefore sensitive at the
margins to one party's efforts to "crack" the other party's supporters into
sizeable but losing minorities across multiple districts-or to "pack" them
into overwhelming majorities in a few districts. 99 As originally conceived by
Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Gill amicus Eric McGhee, the efficiency gap
could provide quantitative thresholds for the constitutionality of legislative
districting plans. 100
The problem with using partisan symmetry as a normative baseline is
that actual partisan symmetry is rare. The concentration of Democrats in
more urban areas and the complexities of political geography are usually
enough to ensure that most district plans are not a level playing field for
Democrats and Republicans, even when drawn by independent commissions
and/or without reference to partisan voter information.101 For example,

96.
97.

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).
See NICHOLAS R. SEABROOK, DRAWING THE LINES: CONSTRAINTS ON PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING IN U.S. POLITICS 58-59 (2017) (noting that the LULAC Court "reject[ed]
partisan symmetry as a standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering," but "expressed
considerable encouragement for its potential use in the future as part of a broader test"); see
also Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of PartisanSymmetry as a Judicial Test for
Partisan GerrymanderingAfter LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 4 (2007) (emphasizing
the justices' "considerable positive attention" to the authors' proposed criterion).
98. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420 (noting that Grofman and
King's partisan asymmetry measure "may in large part depend on conjecture about where
possible vote-switchers will reside"); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 849, 896
(introducing the efficiency gap as "a new measure of partisan symmetry" and arguing that it
"avoids the need to estimate hypothetical election results (and, with it, the need to speculate
about vote switchers' locations).").
99. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 851-52 (relating the efficiency
gap to the measurement of cracking and packing strategies).
100. See id. at 884-85.
101. See Nicholas Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography? How Democrats Won the
Popular Vote But Lost the Congress in 2012, 1 RES. & POL. 1, 1-2 (2014) (observing that "the
current geographic distribution of partisans now leaves Democrats at a disadvantage so long as
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Gill's lead plaintiff William Whitford was "naturally" packed in his district
with other Madison Democrats, a situation that favored Republicans even in
the plaintiffs' demonstration plan.1 02 Such urban concentrations of
Democrats in Madison and Milwaukee led the trial court to find that
"Wisconsin's political geography affords Republicans a modest natural
advantage in districting,"' 03 although it ultimately concluded that this natural
tilt was much smaller than the "large partisan effect" of the challenged
gerrymander.1 04 in focusing on standing, the Supreme Court did not review
these findings. But Chief Justice Roberts's characterization of the efficiency
gap as "sociological gobbledygook" 0 5 at oral argument bespoke his
reluctance to weigh maps on a scale whose values had no meaning to "the
intelligent man on the street,"' 06 let alone one whose baseline of zero had no
corresponding real-world benchmark. 0 7

congressional representation is based on contiguous geographic districts" and surveying
previous studies of this phenomenon).
102. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).
103. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 919-20 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (attributing this
advantage largely to the fact that "Democratic voters are uniquely packed in urban centers like
Milwaukee and Madison").
104. Id. at 926.
105. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (Oct. 3, 2017) (No. 161161) [hereinafter Gill Oral Argument].
106. Id. at 37.
107. The president of the American Sociological Association and other observers took
Chief Justice Roberts to be casting aspersions on all of quantitative social science. See Letter
from Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, President, Am. Sociological Ass'n, to Chief Justice John Roberts
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.asanet.org/news-events/asa-news/asa-president-eduardo-bonillasilva-responds-chief-justice-john-roberts (describing Roberts's comment as an admission of a
"lack of understanding of social science"); Philip Rocco, Justice Roberts Said Political
Science is 'Sociological Gobbledygook' Here's Why He Said It, and Why He's Mistaken,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
4,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/10/04/justice-roberts-said-political-science-is-sociological-gobbledygook-hereswhy-he-said-it-and-why-hes-mistaken/?noredirect=on&utmterm=. 63 5a9d642dl 3 ("In short,
[Roberts] is concerned that voters will not trust judicial decisions based on social science.");
but see Ed Whelan, Speaking of 'Sociological Gobbledygook', NAT'L REv. (Oct. 11, 2017,
3:10
PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/blog/bench-memos/roberts-sociologicalgobbledygook (criticizing Bonilla-Silva for "pretending that the Chief was dismissing all of
sociology as 'gobbledygook."'). The Chief Justice actually was being more specifically critical
of the unreliability of election predictions based on statistical measures of partisan advantage
that had previously been before the Court:
[The plaintiffs in] Bandemer predicted the Democrats would never be able to attain
a majority. It was 50/50 the next election, and they got a majority the one after that.
You already mentioned Vieth. It was five days, right, after the District Court
said . . [the] Republicans are never going to get elected. And they won every single
race. Predicting on the basis of the statistics that are before us has been a very
hazardous enterprise.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 16
1256
C.

[VOL.70: 1241

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

The Motivationfor the Ensemble Approach

Partisan symmetry measurements compare the abilities of parties to
translate statewide votes into seats against a baseline assumption of parity in
electoral performance. Alternative explanations for deviations from this
baseline-including differences in the political geography of different states
as measured by the results of elections for different offices on different
dates-can confound the use of partisan symmetry measures as generalpurpose tools to identify and quantify the effects of partisan
gerrymandering.' 0o
Rather than comparing seats to votes, we instead compare a large
collection (an ensemble) of redistricting plans to an enacted plan. The
ensemble of plans reveals-and discovers-the asymmetric baseline votesto-seats relationships that partisan symmetry measures simply assume away.
There are no a priorijudgments about how votes should translate into seats;
instead the ensemble's plans are randomly generated subject to a stipulated
set of legal criteria for compliant redistricting plans. Such criteria may be
imposed by the United States Constitution,1 09 the Voting Rights Act,"1 0 state
constitutions," state statutes,112 committee resolutions,1 13 and court

Gill Oral Argument, supranote 105, at 48-49.
108. See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286-90 (2004) (rejecting test for
discriminatory effects that looks to whether "the map can thwart the plaintiffs' ability to
translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats" as non-justiciable in light of these
complications).
109. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983) (requiring that any significant
variance in population among districts be necessary to achieve a legitimate state purpose).
110. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (describing a three-pronged
structural test for when "multimember districts . . operate to impair minority voters' ability to
elect representatives of their choice"); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1993)
(extending the applicability of the Gingles test to single-member districting).
111. See, e.g., Wis. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (permitting deviation from population equality to
accommodate traditional districting objectives, requiring assembly districts "to be bounded by
county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact
form as practicable," and senate districts to consist of "convenient contiguous territory"
comprised of undivided assembly districts).
112. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-305 (2001) ("Each election district and precinct
shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory and shall have clearly defined and
clearly observable boundaries.").
113. See,

e.g.,

JOINT REAPPORTIONMENT

COMM.,

Committee

Resolution:

Third

Congressional District Criteria (Aug. 17, 2015) (adopting criteria of population equality,
Voting Rights Act compliance, contiguity, compactness, and preserving communities of
interest for the redrawing of Virginia's Third Congressional District to comply with a court
order).
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orders.11 4 The ensemble is small in comparison with the astronomical
number of compliant plans that could have been drawn" 5 but may still be
deemed representative in the sense that generating many more plans will
have, at most, a negligible effect on the quantitative and qualitative
conclusions. 116
Since all of the ensemble's plans overlay the same political geography
as the challenged plan, many of the ensemble plans will exhibit partisan
effects from natural packing and cracking similar to those in the challenged
plan, while deliberately packed and cracked districts in the challenged plan
will have no counterpart in the ensemble. In this way, ensemble analysis
serves to separate out the effects of political geography from the specific
partisan features of the challenged plan.''1 If the challenged plan's partisan
effects are extreme outliers in comparison with those of the plans in the
ensemble, this finding can serve as evidence that some consideration other
than compliance with stated criteria was involved in the redistricting
process, and can help quantify the vote-diluting effects of cracking and
packing in individual districts and statewide." In the next Part, we will
explain how the Duke team generated and analyzed the ensemble of plans
presented in Rucho.

114. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 627 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub
nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017) (requiring legislature to draw a new
congressional redistricting plan under which race-based redistricting must satisfy strict
scrutiny).
115. See generally Moon Duchin, Geometry v. Gerrymandering,SCI. AM., Nov. 2018, at
49, 51 (noting that there are more than 700 trillion ways of partitioning a 9x9 grid into nine
contiguous districts of equal size).
116. See infra notes 156-53 and accompanying text.
117. See Gregory Herschlag et al., Evaluating Partisan Gerrymanderingin Wisconsin 5
(Sept. 7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.01596.pdf (explaining
that ensemble "analysis allows us to separate out the effect of the geopolitical landscape, and
to show that the [challenged] Act 43 map generates extreme partisan asymmetry above and
beyond this effect"); cf Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, Ill., 535 F.3d 594, 599-600 (7th Cir.
2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (opining that if racial gerrymandering plaintiffs had submitted 1,000
computer-generated "random, race-blind" maps showing that the challenged plan was an
outlier with respect to the number of '"Latino effective' districts . . [t]hen a court might
sensibly conclude that [defendants] had diluted the Latino vote by undermining the normal
effects of the choices that Aurora's citizens had made about where to live.").
118. See Bangia et al., supra note 42, at 2 (describing gerrymandering index and
representativeness index as "measures of gerrymandering where the effects of packing . . and
cracking . . .can be better identified"); id. at 5 (explaining that gerrymandering index
"quantifies how packed or depleted the collection of districts is relative to what is expected
from the ensemble of 'reasonable' redistrictings we have created").
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III. THE ENSEMBLE AT TRIAL

A.

ProceduralHistory

Rucho v. Common Causell9 is a partisan gerrymandering challenge to
the 2016 remedial plan that resulted from an earlier racial gerrymandering
challenge to North Carolina's decennial congressional redistricting.' 20 In
2011, after winning control of both houses of the General Assembly in 2010,
Robert Rucho and David Lewis, the Republican chairs of the Senate and
House redistricting committees, respectively, engaged the Republican
National Committee's redistricting coordinator Thomas Hofeller to redraw
the state's congressional map. 121 The legislators privately instructed Hofeller
that the plan's primary goal was "to create as many districts as possible in
which GOP candidates would be able to successfully compete for office."1 22
The legislators directed Hofeller to "creat[e] new majority African American
districts," 23 ostensibly to comply with section two of the Voting Rights
Act,1 24 but effectively reduced the influence of African American voters by
packing more of them into Districts 1 and 12.125 Under the resulting plans,
Republicans won 9-4 and 10-3 majorities of the state's United States House
seats in 2012 and 2014, respectively.1 26 In the meantime, African American
voters in these districts sued in the Middle District of North Carolina to
challenge the 2011 plan as a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 27 in Cooper v. Harris, the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusions that racial
considerations predominated in the drawing of Districts 1 and 12 and were
not sufficiently warranted by Voting Rights Act concerns to survive strict
scrutiny, 28 leaving in place a February 5, 2016 order for the General
Assembly to draw a new congressional district plan.1 29

119. Common Cause v. Rucho, Nos. 1:16-CV-01026, 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. 2018),
stayedpending appeal sub nom. Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 17A745 (S. Ct. 2018).

120. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 810 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
121. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 607 (M.D.N.C. 2016). Redistricting in
North Carolina is exclusively within the power of the legislative branch and not subject to veto

by the governor. See N.C. CONST., art. II, § 22(5)(b)-(d).
122. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 803.
123. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 608.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 609.
126. See Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 804.
127. See id. (citing Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609-10).
128. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468, 1474 (2017).
129. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 627.
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With Republicans still in control of the General Assembly, Rucho and
Lewis again hired Thomas Hofeller, this time to draw the 2016 remedial
plan.130 The legislators privately instructed Hofeller to use precinct-level
election results from statewide elections, excluding presidential elections, to
ensure that the resulting plan would maintain the 10-3 Republican majority
in the state's congressional delegation.13' By February 13, 2016, Hofeller
presented Rucho and Lewis with a "near-final" version of the enacted
plan,1 32 which Lewis confirmed would yield the intended 10-3 partisan
advantage.1 33 It was only after this fait accompli that the redistricting
committee that Rucho and Lewis co-chaired received public comments and
voted on a set of criteria that purportedly were to govern the redistricting
process.1 34 On February 16, the committee adopted criteria authorizing the
use of election data to support "reasonable efforts to construct districts .

.

. to

maintain the current partisan makeup of North Carolina's congressional
delegation" along party lines, 135 thereby effectively ratifying Rucho and
Lewis's earlier private instructions to Hofeller. Over the next three days, the
committee, the Senate, and the House all adopted Hofeller's plan, with slight
revisions, 136 along party lines. 137 Reflecting the openly partisan redistricting
process, Lewis stated during the House debate, "I think electing Republicans
is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I
38
think is better for the country."1

In August and September 2016, two groups of plaintiffs led by Common
Cause and the League of Women Voters of North Carolina sued Rucho,
Lewis, and other state officials in the Middle District of North Carolina,
challenging the 2016 remedial plan as a partisan gerrymander under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the United
States Constitution. 139 The district court consolidated the cases and
conducted a four-day bench trial in October 2017.140

130. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. at 805.
13 1. See id.
132. See id. at 806-07. The Senate Redistricting Committee revised Hofeller's plan by
shifting two whole precincts and one partial precinct to avoid districting two incumbents
together. See id. at 809 n.6.
133. See id. at 807.
134. See id at 807-08.
135. Id. at 807.
136. See id. at 806-07, 809 n.6.
137. Id at 809.
138. Id
139. See id. at 810-11.
140. See id. at 811.
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Generatingthe North CarolinaEnsemble

In analyzing North Carolina's 2016 congressional redistricting for
presentation at trial, the Duke team aimed to generate a large and diverse set
of legislative plans that complied with a stated set of redistricting criteria.
These nonpartisan criteria were necessarily different from those actually
adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly's redistricting
committee,141 which included a criterion expressly requiring "reasonable
efforts to construct districts ... to maintain the current [10-3] partisan
makeup of North Carolina's congressional delegation"1 42 and resulted in an
openly partisan redistricting process. 143 Instead, the Duke team's ensemble
used criteria taken from a 2015 bipartisan House bill to establish a
nonpartisan commission and process for legislative and congressional
redistricting. 144 Even though this bill died in committee,1 45 we regard its

141. See generally N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. JOINT SELECT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL
REDIST., 2016 CONTINGENT CONGRESSIONAL PLAN COMMITTEE ADOPTED CRITERIA (Feb.
16, 2016).
142. Id.
143. During floor debate on the enacted plan, State Rep. David Lewis, co-chair of the
Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting, stated, "I think electing Republicans is
better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the
country." Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 809 (citation omitted).
144. See H.B. 92, 2015 N.C. Gen. Assemb., 2015-16 Sess. (N.C. 2015). These criteria,
which were to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-4.54, included:
(c) Congressional districts shall each have a population as nearly equal as
practicable to the ideal population, but in all cases within one-tenth of a percent
(0. 1%) of the ideal population.
(d) Legislative and congressional districts shall be drawn in a manner that
complies with requirements of federal and State law.
(e) To the extent consistent with other standards provided by this section, ... [t]he
number of counties and cities divided among more than one district shall be as small
as possible, but in the case of cities located in more than one county, minimizing the
division of counties prevails. The division of VTDs [voting tabulation districts]
shall also be minimized consistent with the other standards of this section.
(f) Districts shall be composed of convenient contiguous territory. Areas which
meet only at the points of adjoining corners are not contiguous.
(g) Districts shall be reasonably compact in form, to the extent consistent with the
standards established by this section. In general, reasonably compact districts are
those which are square, rectangular, or hexagonal in shape, and not irregularly
shaped, to the extent of natural or political boundaries or those of VTDs. If it is
necessary to compare the relative compactness of two or more districts, or of two or
more alternative districting plans, [preference shall be given to the plan comprised
of districts whose maximum north-south and east-west dimensions are, in the
aggregate, most nearly equal and whose total perimeter is smallest].
(h) No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party,
incumbent legislator, or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the
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provisions as representative of the longer-term process of deliberative policy
formation in North Carolina around nonpartisan redistricting criteria.1 46
The algorithmic methods used in building an ensemble of plans require
an often diverse and disparate set of operative redistricting criteria 47 to be
expressed in precise mathematical terms. Thus, for example, in
implementing the proposed nonpartisan criteria, the Duke team had to
interpret the statutory term "irregularly shaped" and define just how
"irregular" one will allow a shape to be before it is no longer compliant.1 48
In principle, the range of typical behavior in an ensemble may change as this
threshold changes, and this must be checked when generating ensembles.1 49
Beyond stated legal requirements and guidelines, a number of implicit
redistricting criteria may also require consideration. For example, the Rucho

purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial
minority group. In establishing districts, no use shall be made of any of the
addresses or geographic locations of incumbents. Except to the extent required by
[applicable law], no use shall be made of: (1) [p]olitical affiliations of registered
voters; (2) [p]revious election results; [or] (3) [d]emographic information, other than
population head counts.
Id.
145. There was no action on the bill following its referral to the House Committee on
Elections. See id.
146. See H.B. 824, 2011 N.C. Gen. Assemb., 2011-12 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (proposing
goals of equal population, legal compliance, preservation of political boundaries, contiguity,
and length-width and perimeter compactness, and excluding goals of favoring parties,
incumbents or racial groups and consideration of incumbents' residences); H.B. 674, 2017
N.C. Gen. Assemb., 2017-18 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (proposing goals of compactness, equal
population, and preservation of political boundaries and communities of interest, and
excluding consideration of party affiliation, past election results, incumbents' residences, and
racial data except for purposes of legal compliance); see also Bangia et al., supra note 42, at 4
(describing H.B. 92 as "just the latest in a chain of bills which have been introduced over the
years with similar criteria and aims").
147. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
148. See Gregory Herschlag et al., Quantifying Gerrymandering in North Carolina 9 (Jan.
9, 2018) [hereinafter Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC] (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.03783 (explaining that ensemble "analysis allows us to separate out
the effect of the geopolitical landscape, and to show that the [challenged] Act 43 map
generates extreme partisan asymmetry above and beyond this effect"); see also Daniel D.
Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a ProceduralSafeguard
Against Partisan Gerrymandering,9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 348-49 (1991) (proposing
isoperimetric measure of compactness); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 555-56 & n.203 (1993) (endorsing Polsby-Popper
score).
149. The analytical conclusions derived from the North Carolina ensemble were robust
against changes in the compactness threshold. See Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra
note 148, at 18. However, it is unknown if this will always be the case.
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defendants challenged some ensemble plans in which a district line traversed
a county line more than once, a feature that has not appeared in recent
enacted plans even though it is not legally prohibited.'o
Having precisely chosen redistricting criteria-or a set of various
redistricting criteria-one may then ask what a typical plan would look like
given these criteria. Although one could, in principle, enumerate all possible
redistricting plans that comply with the criteria, in most cases it is
computationally infeasible, if not impossible, to carry out such an
enumeration, and in fact unnecessary.'"' There are well-established
statistical methods, collectively referred to as Markov Chain Monte Carlo
techniques, for producing a representative ensemble of plans. These
techniques are prolific across many areas of science, including image
processing, molecular systems, genomics, and climate science, and have
given scientists the ability to answer previously unanswerable questions. 152
The basic idea of using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to
generate an ensemble of redistricting plans is to begin with some initial plan
and perform a sequence of random steps, each of which incrementally
changes the configuration of districts.' 53 The possible kinds of incremental
changes are defined a priori. In creating the North Carolina ensemble, the
Duke team defined a step as the reassignment of an arbitrary vote tabulation
district (VTD) on the boundary of a congressional district to an adjacent
district. 5 4 The chance of taking one step as opposed to any other is
characterized so that (1) the steps will often lead to compliant plans and (2)
the sequence of steps will sometimes produce a drastic departure from the
initial plan so that any possible redistricting plan may be reached. As shown
in Figure 1, the sequence of steps make up a "random walk," and compliant
plans along the random walk make up the ensemble of plans. This process
can be made mathematically precise and is theoretically capable of sampling
the entire space of redistricting plans. "' Empirical tests can also provide
practical validation that (1) the ensemble is independent of the initial
redistricting plan and that (2) the ensemble of plans is representative, which

150. See Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 59-60, Common
Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 807-08 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-CCV-1026-WOJEP),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/CCLWVDefendants
ProposedFindingsofFact.pdf.
15 1. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
152. See Christian Robert & George Casella, A Short History of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo: Subjective Recollectionsfrom Incomplete Data, 26 STAT. SC. 102, 106-11 (2011).
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 8.
155. But see Bangia et al., supra note 42, at 27 (noting that the authors were unable to
explore the entire space of redistrictings, perhaps because of premature system cooling).
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/

is to say that the conclusions drawn from the ensemble will not change if
more plans were to be gathered. 156

7-

Secand slop in walk

Initial state

First step mn wak

Other possible
stepsslp

Other possible

Figure 1. The initial plan is altered by changing VTD district
assignments. Once many of these small changes are made, the districting
plan is entirely different from where it began. The new plan periodically is
examined; if it is compliant with the redistricting criteria, it is added to the
ensemble.

156. See Andrew Gelman & Donald B. Rubin, Inference from Iterative Simulation Using
Multiple Sequences, 7 STAT. SCI. 457, 458 (1992) (providing statistical test); Benjamin Fifield
et al., A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (May 24,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist.pdf
(illustrating application of statistical test to redistricting problems); see Quantifying
Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 17-19 (reviewing validation tests).
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The Duke team generated an ensemble of over 24,000 compliant
redistricting plans that was submitted to the district court via VTD district
assignment based around a precisely-chosen set of redistricting criteria. '57
Changing the relative importance of redistricting criteria may, in general,
alter the conclusions of the initial ensemble. To test the robustness of the
conclusions drawn from the primary ensemble of over 24,000 plans, many
smaller ensembles were also generated and examined to verify that the
relevant characteristics of the primary ensemble were insensitive to
variations in redistricting criteria. 1 Such tests included, for example,
reducing county splits in favor of slightly less compact districts.159 In
another test, an ensemble was generated that considered an alternative
definition of compactness. 160
In addition to validating that the results were insensitive to changes in
the redistricting criteria, the Duke team also tested the robustness of the
primary ensemble by showing, for example, that the results did not change
when starting with different initial plans, nor did they change when over
100,000 samples were gathered. These two robustness tests help to
demonstrate that the generated plans are well "mixed"; i.e., they are
representative of the entire space, rather than merely some subset of it. 161

157. See Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 1.
158. See id. at 18-20.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Ensuring good "mixing" is a major challenge in generating ensembles. See Dana
Randall, Rapidly Mixing Markov Chains with Applications in Computer Science and Physics,
COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING 30 (Mar./Apr. 2006). Several methodologies to aid mixing
have been employed in generating ensembles of redistricting plans. Two such methods,
parallel and simulated tempering, have been shown by a research team at Princeton University
(now at Harvard) to be effective in generating well-mixed (though relatively small) ensembles
using contiguity, population, and compactness criteria. See Fifield et al., supra note 156, at 1730. Recent work by the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group at Tufts University
developed a new way to take a step in the random walk by using a split and merge technique
on adjacent district pairs. Although the technical details are not yet published, this is a
promising avenue forward in generating fast-mixing Markov Chains. Anthony Pizzimenti,
Research at the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group 6-9 (July 30, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://myweb.uiowa.edu/apizzimenti/files/documents/whitepaper.pdf (describing preliminary
work on this approach). It is also possible to avoid the issue of mixing. A team at Carnegie
Mellon University developed a localized theorem to test hypotheses that a given redistricting
plan is atypical of the space of sampled redistricting plans. Instead of using an ensemble to
understand what the partisan election results would have been in the absence of partisan
gerrymandering, the idea is to test if a plan is atypical by comparing it with all local plans
within a given random walk. Because only local plans are considered, one does not need to
guarantee that random walk has mixed but can still draw conclusions from the ensemble. See
generally Chikina et al., supra note 53.
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C. Analyzing the North CarolinaEnsemble
To analyze the partisan skew of the enacted plan relative to the
ensemble, elections were simulated on each plan in the ensemble using
partisan voting data from past elections. Although the use of partisan data
neglects effects of incumbency and preferences for particular candidates,1 62
these effects were substantially controlled by harmonizing results from
diverse statewide races, including United States Senate, Governor, and
Presidential races. 163 For each simulated election, the number of predicted
Democratic and Republican officials were recorded along with their margins
of victory. The team found that the simulated elections almost never resulted
in as many as ten seats won by the Republicans, with the median number of
Republicans elected varying gradually on the ensemble's median, from six
to nine as the statewide Republican vote share shifted from forty-eight to
fifty-six percent. 164
Reflecting a district-by-district strategy of packing and cracking
Democratic voters, the ensemble analysis revealed that the three most
Democratic districts had significantly more Democratic votes than in any
plan in the ensemble in the 2016 congressional election. On average, the
three most Democratic districts in the ensemble held an average Democratic
vote share of 61.32 percent, and the plan in the ensemble with the highest
average Democratic vote share held 66.25 percent. 165 In contrast, the three
most Democratic districts of the 2016 enacted plan held 67.93 percent of the
vote share, suggesting these districts have been packed. 166 The next three
most Democratic districts had fewer Democrats than in any plan of the
ensemble. 167 On average, the next three most Democratic districts in the
ensemble held an average Democratic vote share of 51.16 percent, and the
plan in the ensemble with the lowest average Democratic vote share held

162. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004) (noting that "[p]olitical
affiliation . . . may shift from one election to the next; and even within a given election, not all
voters follow the party line").
163. The defendants found it satisfactory to use a somewhat less diverse collection of
partisan voting data from past elections in support of their declared goal of preserving a 10-3
seat advantage. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 807 (2018) (quoting
redistricting committee's criterion permitting use of election data from "statewide
contests . . .not including the last two presidential contests"); id. at 806-07 (describing
Lewis's acceptance of draft plan based on outcomes predicted by results of the 2014 United
States Senate race between Thom Tillis and Kay Hagan).
164. See Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 18-20.
165. See id at 16.
166. See id.
167. See Joint Appendix at 383-84, Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422 (S.Ct. filed
Feb. 8, 2019).
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45.72 percent. 168 In contrast, the next three most Democratic districts of the
2016 enacted plan held 42.96 percent of the vote share, suggesting that
districts have been cracked of Democratic voters.1 69 In fact, the fourththrough sixth-most Democratic districts would often elect Democrats in the
ensemble, but were never predicted to do so in the enacted plan. 170
The team's primary demonstrative exhibit at trial was the comparison of
the 2016 enacted plan with a demonstration plan created by a bipartisan
group of retired state judges'17 and with typical plans in the ensemble, as
shown in Figure 1.172 To construct this graph, the thirteen districts in each
redistricting plan were ranked from lowest to highest by Democratic vote
share. The ensemble of plans thereby gives rise to a collection of most
Republican districts, a collection of second-most Republican districts, and so
on, each of which has a distribution that can serve as a basis for comparison
with the corresponding ranked districts in the enacted plan and in the retired
judges' plan. The ordered comparisons reveal finer level details about the
anomalous nature of the enacted plan. For example, the ensemble of plans
reveals that the fourth- and fifth-most Democratic districts more often than
not would elect Democratic representatives; the enacted map, in contrast,
elects Republicans in these districts by over twelve percentage points. In
addition to revealing anomalies in the winning party, the ensemble also
reveals that election results may be solidified. In the sixth-most Democratic
district, the Republican candidate in the enacted plan wins the election by a
greater margin than in over 99.8% of plans in the ensemble. This abnormal
and discriminatory arrangement of the electoral performance of North
Carolina's congressional districts served to "consistently degrade[]
[Democratic voters'] ... influence on the political process as a whole."1 73

168. See id. at 351, 360. Percentages were not presented in the case but were calculated
by Author Herschlag from the 24,000 ensemble maps that were entered into evidence. Data on
file with Author Herschlag. See also Rucho, 318 F.Supp.3d at 872-83 (describing the 2012 and
2016 Democratic vote shares in Districts 9 and 13 as extremely low outliers in comparison
with "the equivalent districts in the ensemble").
169. See id Percentages were not presented in the case but were calculated by Author
Herschlag from the 24,000 ensemble maps that were entered into evidence. Data on file with
Author Herschlag.
170. See id.
171. See Press Release, Duke Sanford School of Public Policy, Nonpartisan Redistricting
Panel
Reveals Unofficial NC Congressional Voting Map (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://sanford.duke.edu/articles/nonpartisan-redistricting-panel-reveals-unofficial-nccongressional-voting-map.
172. See also Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (reproducing a version of the graph).
173. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
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D. Adjudicating the "Signatureof Gerrymandering"
After trial, the three-judge panel found for the plaintiffs on all claims
and enjoined the 2016 plan's use in the 2018 elections, with Judge Wynn
authoring the majority opinion and Judge Osteen dissenting.1 74 In
adjudicating the plaintiffs' vote dilution theory, the majority found that the
sharply contrasting curves successfully "demonstrated that the General
Assembly 'cracked' and 'packed' Democratic voters." 7 First, the retired
judges' plan closely aligns with the ensemble, providing validation that the
ensemble's performance in elections is consistent with that of a plan drawn
by skilled human drafters adhering to legitimate nonpartisan criteria.1 76
Second, the enacted plan sharply deviates from the ensemble, reflecting the
packing of Democratic voters into the three most Democratic districts and
the cracking of Democratic voters in at least the three next-most Democratic
districts.

1

Synthesizing this evidence, the majority opinion referred to the Rucho
plaintiffs' characterization of these district-by-district deviations between the
enacted plan and the ensemble of plans as the "signature of
gerrymandering," 7 signifying discriminatory intent. The majority found the
team's analysis to "provide strong evidence that the General Assembly
intended to subordinate the interests of non-Republican voters and entrench
the Republican Party in power."1 79 The majority repeated this terminology in
its analysis of discriminatory effects,'s concluding from our analyses that
"the 2016 Plan had a measurable tangible adverse impact on supporters of
non-Republican candidates."'

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 690 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
See id. at 643.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 644.
See id. at 657.
Id. at 666.
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Figure 2: The "signature of gerrymandering." Collections of districts in
the North Carolina ensemble are ranked in ascending order of Democratic
vote share. The distribution of Democratic vote shares in each of the ranked
districts of the ensemble is displayed with a standard box and whisker
plot.' 82 Overlaying the box plots are the ranked-votes curves of the enacted
plan, the median, and a plan drawn by a bipartisan panel of retired judges.' 83

182. See Jonathan Mattingly, Marginal Box-Plots: Summarizing What is Typical,
QUANTIFYING
GERRYMANDERING
(Feb.
11,
2018),
https://sites.duke.edu/quantify
inggerrymandering/2018/02/11 /marginal-box-plots-summarizing-what-is-typical.
183. See Press Release, supra note 171.
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THE ENSEMBLE ON REMAND

A.

Gill's "ThresholdQuestions"

The Rucho defendants appealed the district court's decision to the
Supreme Court, 8 4 which stayed the injunction' and ultimately vacated and
remanded the decision for reconsideration in light of its standing decision in
Gill. 8 6 Rucho's remand proceedings therefore placed a special emphasis on
addressing the issues adjudicated in Gill. 187
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts,"' the Court decided in
Gill that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate standing to bring their
claims that the Wisconsin legislature's 2011 redistricting violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, without addressing the justiciability or merits of the
claims themselves. 8 9 Describing partisan gerrymandering as a harm "to [the
voter] as [an] individual[],"1 90 the Court found that only four of the twelve
voter-plaintiffs had complained of equal protection injuries specifically
stemming from the packing or cracking of their own districts, and that all of
the plaintiffs had incorrectly focused at trial on proving statewide harm. In
light of these jurisdictional concerns, the Court vacated and remanded the
Wisconsin district court's decision in Gill,'9' and summarily did the same
with the North Carolina court's decision in Rucho.1 92
In a concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan sought to clarify the
plaintiffs' burdens of proof in showing district-specific harms, both for the
standing inquiry and for constitutional adjudication of their vote dilution
claims on the merits. 193 Kagan offered that a plaintiff could meet the equal
protection standing requirement by "show[ing] that her district has been
packed or cracked," for example, by:

184. See Defs. Notice of Appeal, Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (filed
Jan. 11, 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-1026).
185. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 45.

187. See generally Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 799 (M.D.N.C. 2018)
(stating conclusion, on the first page of a 159-page opinion, that plaintiffs have standing
"under the test set forth in Gill").

188.
189.
190.
original).
191.

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1922 (2018).
Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1930 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186, 206 (1962)) (alterations in

Id. at 1934.

192. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.

193. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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produc[ing] an alternative map (or set of alternative maps)comparably consistent with traditional districting principles under
which her vote would carry more weight. For example, a
Democratic plaintiff living in a 75%-Democratic district could
prove she was packed by presenting a different map, drawn without
a focus on partisan advantage, that would place her in a 60%Democratic district. Or conversely, a Democratic plaintiff residing
in a 35%-Democratic district could prove she was cracked by
offering an alternative, neutrally drawn map putting her in a 50-50
district. The precise numbers are of no import. The point is that the
plaintiff can show, through drawing alternative district lines, that
partisan-based packing or cracking diluted her vote.1 94
Gill thus left in place what Chief Justice Roberts characterized as the
"two threshold questions [that] remain" from the Court's partisan
gerrymandering jurisprudence: "what is necessary to show standing in a case
of this sort, and whether those claims are justiciable."1 95 In Rucho, the Duke
team's ensemble analysis was instrumental in the district court's
adjudication of each of these threshold questions on remand, as the
following sections will show.
B. District-SpecificStanding
On remand, the district court emphatically distinguished Rucho from
Gill with respect to the district-specific standing requirement for equal
protection claims based on the harm of vote dilution. The court unanimously
concluded that, unlike the Gill plaintiffs who "failed to meaningfully pursue
their allegations of individual harm," 196 Rucho's voter-plaintiffs resided in
all of the challenged districts and "testified to, introduced evidence to
support, and, in all but one case, ultimately proved the type of dilutionary
injury the Supreme Court recognized in Gill."197 What follows in this

194. Id. at 1936, 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, Kagan
concurred with the majority's refusal to adjudicate the statewide statistical evidence because
"the plaintiffs tried this case as though it were about vote dilution alone" and "did not
sufficiently advance a First Amendment associational theory." Id. at 1939.
195. Id. at 1929.
196. Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 817 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (citing Gill,
138 S. Ct. at 1932).
197. Id. at 820; see also id. at 817-18 (discussing the theory and evidence presented by
the Common Cause Plaintiffs); id. at 818-19 (discussing the theory and evidence presented by
the League of Women Voters Plaintiffs); id. at 947 (Osteen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (expressly stating concurrence with this conclusion).
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section is a review of the evidence-including the Duke team's ensemble
evidence-cited by the district court on remand in Rucho to support its
conclusions regarding the district-specific standing requirement.
To assess the Rucho court's approach to district-specific standing, it is
first necessary to recognize a latent ambiguity in the Gill Court's two
descriptions of the dilutionary injury from partisan gerrymandering:
To the extent the plaintiffs' alleged harm is the dilution of their
votes, that injury is district specific. An individual voter in
Wisconsin is placed in a single district. He votes for a single
representative. The boundaries of the district, and the composition
of its voters, determine whether and to what extent a particular
voter is packed or cracked. This "disadvantage to [the voter] as [an]
individual[]," therefore results from the boundaries of the particular
district in which he resides.

Here, the plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims turn on
allegations that their votes have been diluted. That harm arises from
the particular composition of the voter's own district, which causes
his vote having been packed or cracked to carry less weight than
it would carry in another, hypothetical district.198
The ambiguity lies in the fact that the italicized sentence may be read as
providing either an exhaustive or non-exhaustive list of the determinants of a
vote dilution injury's existence and severity.
The exhaustive interpretation holds that "whether and to what extent a
particular voter is packed or cracked" depends only on "[t]he boundaries of
the [voter's assigned] 199 district, and the composition of its voters." 200 The
subsequent sentence, which causally attributes the dilution injury to "the
boundaries of the particular district in which he resides," 201 strongly
supports this interpretation. It also implies that all voters of the same party
and cracked or packed in the same district as the plaintiff suffer the same
dilution injury, consistent with the Court's conclusion that the "burden arises

198. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930-31 (internal citations omitted).
199. See id. at 1930 (providing the sentence: "An individual voter in Wisconsin is placed
in a single district" as the referent for the definite noun phrase "the district").
200. Id.
201. Id.
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through a voter's placement in a 'cracked' or 'packed' district." 202 Further

supporting this reading is the Court's finding that four of the Gill plaintiffs
had adequately pled vote dilution claims by virtue of alleging that they "live
in districts where Democrats like them have been packed or cracked." 203
The non-exhaustive reading holds that "whether and to what extent a
particular voter is packed or cracked" may also depend on the specific
location of the voter's residence. Support for this view comes from the fact
that the range of hypothetical districts against which it is reasonable to
compare the voter's district in a vote-dilution theory 204 is sensitive to the
voter's location within the district. For example, natural packing is more
likely to confound remedial redistricting efforts if the voter resides in the
core of an urban district rather than its suburban periphery. 205 Compared
with the exhaustive interpretation's district-based approach, a locationspecific theory of vote dilution supports Article III standing at least as well a
fortiori, insofar as it is "particularized" 206 to the plaintiffs household and
not "dispensed in gross."207
The "signature of gerrymandering" addresses only the first, exhaustive
interpretation of the Gill Court's description of vote dilution. It is well-suited
for identifying enacted districts in which packing and cracking has occurred,
but it does not immediately identify the specific locations of voters whose
influence has been diluted relative to the influence they would have had
under a more typical redistricting. 208 For example, in North Carolina, the
ensemble revealed that it was typical to have three districts with a fifty-five
to sixty percent Republican vote share in the 2016 congressional general
election; however, the 2016 enacted plan had six districts in this range, and
three of these six districts exhibited cracking of Democrats relative to their

202. Id. at 1931.
203. See id. at 1931 (finding that Mary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet
Mitchell, and Jerome Wallace "pleaded a particularized burden" from vote dilution); id at
1934 (remanding to allow plaintiffs "to prove concrete and particularized injuries" at trial).
204. The injury-in-fact requirement for standing, which excludes "conjectural or

hypothetical" harms, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), logically
necessitates some limitations on the range of hypothetical districts that can be used to support
any particular vote-dilution theory.
205. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1936; see also UnintentionalGerrymandering,supra note 53,
at 266 (describing constraints on remedial redistricting imposed by political geography).
206. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating standing requirement of "concrete and
particularized" injury).

207. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
353 (2006)) ("Standing is not dispensed in gross . . . .").
208. See
John
Mattingly,
Towards a
Localized Analysis,
QUANTIFYING
GERRYMANDERING
(July
12, 2018),
https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/
2018/07/12/towards-a-localized-analysis.
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counterparts in the ensemble. 209 Accordingly, the Rucho court credited the
"signature of gerrymandering," inter alia, with supporting most of the
plaintiffs' district-specific claims by showing that all but one of the enacted
districts "reflect[] a successful effort by the General Assembly" either "to
concentrate, or pack, voters who were unlikely to support a Republican
candidate, and thereby dilute such voters' votes" 210 or "to crack likely
Democratic voters and thereby dilute their votes by submerging them in a
safe Republican district." 21 1

Serving as an expert witness for the League of Women Voters, Jowei
Chen filed a supplemental declaration during the remand proceedings that
addressed the second, non-exhaustive reading of the Gill Court's
characterization of vote dilution. 212 Specifically, Chen prepared a table
comparing the average Republican vote shares based on the election data
used by Hofeller-in the district containing each plaintiffs precinct under
the enacted plan and in the district that would contain the plaintiffs precinct
in a demonstration plan.213 Chen also performed similar comparisons with
each of 2,000 other simulated districting plans. 214 In the district-by-district
standing analysis, the Rucho court credited these comparisons with showing
that the plaintiffs' votes "would have carried greater weight in numerous
other 'hypothetical district[s] ."215
Without expressly acknowledging the ambiguity in the Gill Court's
characterization of voting dilution, the Rucho court's adjudication of the
district-specific standing requirement thereby addressed both interpretations
of the opinion. We believe the more natural reading of the opinion,
especially in light of the Court's adjudication of the four district-specific
claims, 216 is that voters throughout a cracked or packed district have equal
standing to challenge the district's boundaries and composition-and that
the specific location of a voter-plaintiffs residence comes into play only
later as it influences the range of hypothetical districts capable of remedying
the plaintiff's injury. Regardless of how the ambiguity is ultimately resolved

209. See Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 3-4.
210. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 821 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
211. See id. at 823.
212. See Suppl. Decl. of Jowei Chen, App. 2 to League of Women Voters Pls.' Br.,
League of Women Voters v. Rucho (filed July 11, 2018) (No. 1:16-CV-1164-WO-JEP), aff'd
sub nom.
Common
Cause v.
Rucho,
318
F.
Supp.
3d 777
(2018),
https://campaignlegal.org/document/rucho-v-league-women-voters-north-carolina-us-districtcourt-middle-district-north- 1.
213. See id. at 6.
214. See Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 821 (citing Third Chen Decl. 4, 6-8, 11).
215. See id. (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018)).
216. See supra text accompanying note 203.
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on appeal, however, the combination of the Duke team's district-based
analysis of packing and cracking-and Jowei Chen's localized comparisons
with hypothetical districts will support the plaintiffs' standing to bring
their vote dilution claims.
C. Justiciability
On remand, the Rucho defendants contested the justiciability of
ensemble analysis as a basis for inferring discriminatory intent and effect,
characterizing this approach as "'a smorgasbord of alleged 'social science'
theories' that lack any constitutional basis."2 17 The district court responded
with a ringing defense of the utility of statistical evidence in adjudication to
vindicate core constitutional values:
Legislative Defendants are correct that none of these empirical
analyses appear in the Constitution. But Plaintiffs need not show
that a particular empirical analysis or statistical measure appears in
the Constitution to establish that a judicially manageable standard
exists to resolve their constitutional claims. Rather, Plaintiffs must
identify cognizable constitutional standards to govern their claims,
and provide credible evidence that Defendants have violated those
standards. And contrary to Legislative Defendants' assertions,
Plaintiffs do not seek to constitutionalize any of the empirical
analyses they have put forward to support their claims, nor does this
Court do so. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that these analyses provide
evidence that the 2016 Plan violates a number of well-established
constitutional standards-that the government act impartially, not
infringe the right to vote, not burden individuals based on the
exercise of their rights to political speech and association, and not
allow state legislatures to dictate electoral outcomes or interpose
themselves between the voters and their representatives in
Congress. 218
The court proceeded to recount prominent examples of constitutional claims
that had crucially depended on statistical and social science evidence. 219
As one of us argued as an amicus in Gill, causal inference based on
statistical evidence is particularly well-suited to the adjudication of

217. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 852 (quoting Leg. Defs. Post-Trial Br.).
218. Id. at 853 (citations omitted).
219. See id. at 853-54 (citing, inter alia, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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constitutional challenges to computer-assisted redistricting. 220 Recognizing
this, the Rucho court acknowledged that "the judiciary ... has an obligation
to keep pace with technological and methodological advances so it can
effectively fulfill its constitutional role to police ever more sophisticated
modes of discrimination." 22' The court characterized our ensemble approach
and other empirical methods introduced at trial as the kinds of "new methods
of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens
gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties," as
foretold by Justice Kennedy in Vieth. 222
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The Supreme Court's partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence in the
thirty-five years since Bandemer has left open the possibility of a justiciable
quantitative standard, 223 but it has cabined this possibility with a growing
recognition of alternative explanations for partisan disparities in electoral
performance 224 and, in Gill, with the characterization of vote dilution as a
district-specific injury. 225 Previous quantitative measures of gerrymandering
have generally failed to address these jurisprudential concerns insofar as
they have been predicated on a priori assumptions about the relationship
between the seats won by a political party and the votes cast for that political
party. 226
Although automated redistricting tools have been around since the
1960s,

227

generating an ensemble of comparison plans from a known

distribution is a relatively new field that contains a plethora of open and
interesting scientific questions. Such questions involve how best to sample
from the space, 228 and even on the choice of distribution and its effect on
different classes of conclusions. For example, the Duke team used a
weighted distribution that favored more compact plans. 229 Other research
teams, such as those at Carnegie Mellon University 230 and Tufts

220. See Gill Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 6.
221. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
222. See id. at 856 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312-13 (2004)).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
225. See supra text accompanying note 190.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 101-107.
227. See Quantifying Gerrymandering in NC, supra note 148, at 7.
228. See Randall, supra note 161 (discussing open problems relating to ensuring that the
random walk used to gather the sample "mixes" well).
229. See supra text accompanying note 155.
230. See Chikina et al., supra note 53.
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University, 231 prefer to use uniform distributions that give equal weight to
all plans below a specified compactness threshold. 232 Ultimately, it is still
unknown whether there are circumstances in which the choice of distribution
will affect the conclusions drawn from an ensemble; however, preliminary
results suggest the conclusions are remarkably robust. Despite these open
scientific questions, we can already test for robustness and sensitivity of
ensembles on a case-by-case basis to test the validity and robustness of the
conclusions drawn.
The proceedings in Rucho thus far have demonstrated the potential
utility of ensemble analysis in federal constitutional adjudication of partisan
gerrymandering claims, paralleling last year's election-changing litigation in
Pennsylvania. As the case returns to the Supreme Court on appeal, we are
optimistic that the fundamental shift in the quantitative analysis of
gerrymandering from partisan asymmetry measures to the ensemble
approach will prove to be an enduring and productive one.
The Rucho appeal presents the Court with its first opportunity to review
the ensemble approach to identifying partisan gerrymandering and
quantifying its effects. Ensemble approaches make no a priori assumptions
about votes-seats relationships, and, in particular, do not assume
proportionality. Instead, ensemble approaches take stipulated legal
redistricting criteria as the starting point for ensemble generation and
analysis, and reveal atypical electoral performance in individual districts as
well as in the statewide outcome. Because political geography that results in
"natural" partisan disparities affects ensemble maps in the same way that it
affects the challenged map, political geography can be eliminated as an
alternative explanation for a challenged map's outlier status. By addressing
these jurisprudential concerns and by identifying and quantifying harms at a
district-specific level through the "signature of gerrymandering," ensemble
analysis holds considerable promise for understanding and adjudicating
gerrymandering disputes.

231. See generally Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Grp., supra note 53.
232. See id. at 21.
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